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Hichilema and Another v Lungu and Another
(2016/CC/0031)[2016] ZMCC 4 (5 September 2016)
Minority Judgement 
Dunia P. Zongwe
On September 5th 2016, there was tension in the packed Constitutional 
Court. Three out of five Constitutional Court judges (i.e., Anne Mwewa-
Sitali, Mugeni Mulenga and Palan Mulonda) dismissed the election 
petition of Presidential candidate Hakainde Hichilema and his running 
mate Geoffrey Mwamba, on the grounds that the time for hearing the 
petition had lapsed. The President of the Court Justice Hildah Chibomba, 
and Justice Margaret Munalula dissented.
Dividing the Court was the interpretation and effect of Articles 101(5) 
and 103(2) of the Constitution of Zambia. Articles 101 (5) and 103 (2) 
provide that the Constitutional Court must hear a Presidential election 
petition within 14 days of the filing of the petition. The Constitution is 
silent as to what happens when the hearing of a petition exceeds the 14-
day period. While the majority of the Court dismissed the petition on 
the grounds that the 14-day period had elapsed, the minority dissented, 
and held that maintaining the time frame was unworkable, and that the 
petitioners had a right to be, and therefore should have been, heard.
This comment discusses the dissenting opinion of the judgment. It 
focuses primarily on Justice Munalula’s dissent since Justice Chibomba’s 
judgement largely echoed Justice Munalaula’s dissenting opinion.
The dissent
According to Justice Munalula, the decision of the majority was based on 
a literal construction of Articles 101(5) and 103(2) of the Constitution of 
Zambia. In short, whereas the majority of the Court interpreted Article 
101(5) strictly, the minority did not believe that a proper interpretation 




of the article was to deny the petitioners the right to a hearing once the 
14 days had expired. 
Justice Munalula advocated the construction of the Constitution as a 
whole and held that the issue of a Presidential election petition was too 
important to be left to a mechanical interpretation of article 105 and 
103. Justice Munalula began her judgment by stating that while the 
common and ordinary meaning of the actual words used is the starting 
point in the construction of a constitutional provision, an “unrelieved 
focus” on the words “within fourteen days of the filing of the petition” 
cannot yield a correct answer to the question at hand. She insisted that 
a literal interpretation of Articles 101(5) and 103(2) entails interpreting 
the provisions in isolation from the rest of the Constitution.
Furthermore, she considered two aspects of the Constitution as relevant 
to the interpretation at hand: first, the issue of implied powers and 
second, the Bill of Rights. Article 271 of the Constitution provides for 
implied powers while article 267 provides for an interpretation of the 
Constitution in line with the Bill of Rights. Justice Munalula held that 
under Article 271 of the Constitution, the Court enjoys implied powers 
to interpret Article 101(5) liberally. She then reminded the Court that 
Article 261, read with Article 9, imposes the obligation on the Court to 
interpret the Constitution in a manner that is consonant with the Bill of 
Rights and the values and principles of the Constitution. National unity 
and democracy are two such values. She further pointed out that Article 
118 provides that judicial authority emanates from the people and that 
the courts must apply that power “without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities”, and in a manner that promotes accountability.
Munalula also noted that, when conceiving the 14-day requirement, the 
authors of the Zambian Constitution had in mind the “endemic delays” 
that had characterized previous Presidential election petitions making 
“a mockery of the process”. The framers of the constitution sought to 
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balance the need for a speedy resolution of election petitions against 
the need to actually have a hearing. She pointed out further that the 
primary purpose of setting a time limit is to enable the Court to hear 
and determine a petition without undue delay as well as make one of the 
specified pronouncements based on a solid finding of both fact and law.
If the process of hearing the petition is not completed she reasoned, the 
purpose of the 14-day requirement is frustrated. In her view, complying 
with the 14-day deadline without the intended event having been achieved 
results in an absurdity. Justice Munalula concluded that the Court would 
have best served the nation by allowing a full hearing rather than relying 
on a technicality to deny a hearing.
Analysis
The 14-Day Time Frame
Both dissenting opinions agreed that the time frame for hearing 
Presidential petitions, as provided for in the Constitution, was not 
practical. Justice Munalula wondered if such a time frame is ‘feasible’ 
at all. The expectation that, within that strict time frame, pleadings 
and other pre-trial process would be exchanged, witnesses heard, and 
judgment handed down appeared unrealistic to both dissenting justices.
Justice Munalula pointed out that, as soon as the order to hear witnesses 
and evidence was given on September 2nd 2016, the petitioners should 
have moved for an interpretation of Article 101(5). She lamented their 
failure to do so. However it appears that interpretation of the 14-day 
requirement was not the real issue. The real issue was whether 14 days 
was sufficient for the petitioners to present their case thus satisfying 
their right to be heard. This is less a question of interpretation than 
one of fact. It is not conclusively clear whether 14 days are sufficient 
or not. The 2013 Presidential election petition in Kenya suggests that, 
with certain adjustments to court procedures, complying with a 14-day 
time frame is possible. However in looking at the Kenyan example, one 
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must remember that in order for the court to comply with the 14-day 
requirement, it dispensed with hearing witnesses and restricted itself to 
affidavit evidence only. Additionally, while it gave its ruling within 14 
days, it gave the reasons for the ruling later. These are drastic measures 
for a court to take, and it is not clear that complying with a time frame 
always justifies the imposition of such measures. 
Incisively, Justice Munalula held that contrary to the claim of the majority, 
the hands of the Court were not tied. This is because Article 118(2)(e) 
of the Zambian Constitution allows the Court to override procedural 
technicalities. Surely, a Constitutional court ought to have the power to 
interpret the Constitution broadly and avoid “the austerity of tabulated 
legalism”, she reasoned. A constitutional court cannot be a prisoner to 
the text of the constitution it is tasked to interpret, and much less a slave 
of its procedural rules.
However, even though the Court did not expressly couch it in those 
terms, it emerges from both the majority and minority judgment that 
the outcome of the petition was heavily influenced by the failure on the 
part of the petitioners to avail themselves of the time, however short, and 
the opportunity they were given to make their case. The Court seems to 
be saying that, even if there had been more time, the petitioners’ lawyers 
were not keen on using that time productively.
The lawyers’ conduct
At first blush, the conduct of the petitioners’ lawyers appears erratic and 
self-defeatist. If there is a point on which the entire Constitutional Court 
agreed, it was without a doubt, in the condemnation of the strange and 
ostensibly self-defeating behaviour of the petitioners’ lawyers in the case. 
On September 2nd, the petitioners’ lawyers lodged several motions that 
took most of the day. The court dismissed the motions. By early evening, 
it was clear to the Court that the petitioners’ lawyers had no intention of 
calling witnesses. The Court announced that only four hours remained 
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of the 14-day time frame. The court asked the petitioners’ lawyers to 
proceed. Rather than proceed, the petitioners’ lawyers withdrew from the 
case on the grounds that they were not able to present their case in the 
remaining 4 hours. At this point, the petitioners, representing themselves 
in person, asked the Court for additional time to find new lawyers to 
represent them. The Court obliged. 
But what may initially appear as erratic behaviour on the part of the 
petitioners’ lawyers, must be understood in the context of the Court’s 
own conduct.
The Court’s own conduct
On September 2, the day that was supposedly to be the first day of the 
hearing, the Court stressed that the 14-day period was rigid and that the 
hearing had to be concluded on the same day around 23h45, and that 
the available hours that remained would be shared equally between the 
petitioners and the respondents. Later that same night, the full bench of 
the Constitutional Court would tell the parties to the electoral disputes 
that they would have two days each to present their case, and that trial 
would begin on September 5th and end on September 8th. However, on 
September 8th, in a 180-degree turn, the majority reversed the earlier 
full bench ruling on the grounds that because the 14-day period for the 
hearing of the petition had expired on September 2nd, the court did not 
have jurisdiction to continue the proceedings. 
It follows from the observations made above that the call by Justices 
Chibomba and Munalula for the extension of the time in this particular 
petition would have been more persuasive if they had based that call on 
the fact that the Court did not properly conduct itself, and had failed 
to ensure that the constitutional mandate to actually have a hearing was 
complied with. This is especially so in light of the fact that the extension of 
time was agreed to by all the judges of the Constitutional Court on Friday 
the 2nd of September, and then mysteriously reversed two days later. 
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Speedy resolution versus fair hearing
Justice Munalula brought out the competing interests behind the 
‘technicality’ that call for careful balancing. She wrote that although 
the framers of the Zambian Constitution were interested in the 
speedy resolution of Presidential election petitions, that interest must 
be tempered by the constitutional need to actually have a hearing. 
Justice Munalula was right in extrapolating the tension between speedy 
resolution and actual hearing, but failed to justify why the Court should 
have tipped the balance in favour of having a hearing, and away from 
speedy resolution, especially since she blamed the petitioners’ for time 
wasting. Condemning the petitioner’s time-wasting motions, on the one 
hand, and arguing for an extension of the time for the hearing, on the 
other, seems inconsistent. 
The underlying issue
In closing her dissenting opinion, Justice Munalula made a perceptive 
observation. She said that neither party to the electoral dispute trusted 
the Court to do the right thing. “If we as a country want to develop 
constitutionalism in this country we need to begin to trust the institutions 
and the persons in those institutions,” she held.
Assuming that Munalula was correct in observing that neither party 
trusted the Court, then the inevitable outcome is that the Court’s 
decision was bound to be rejected. In other words, rejection of the Court’s 
adjudication would be automatic and 100% guaranteed to happen. It is a 
classic case of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’.
In the final analysis, the lack of trust of the court, from either party, 
though not visible on the surface, appears to be underlying problem in 
this whole matter and it accounts for the conduct of the petitioners’ legal 
representatives inside the courtroom.
This underlying problem however, is one that the Constitution addresses 
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indirectly: It requires that the Court be impartial and procedurally fair. 
In this case, any impression of impartiality was dashed by the Court’s 
conduct that culminated in the weekend meeting to overturn the full 
bench decision of the court on the night of September 2. 
Conclusion
It is not easy for a court to make a decision on a deeply polarizing and 
acrimonious issue, especially when election results are as close as those 
of the 2016 Zambian Presidential elections. This difficulty is made worse 
if neither party to the dispute trusts the Court. In such circumstances, 
whatever the outcome of a court’s deliberations, it is certain to be 
perceived as biased.
It is clear that the Constitutional Court of Zambia failed to bring sanity 
to what was a chaotic process. Litigation in Zambia is judge-driven, 
and the Court has a duty to control the courtroom and the proceedings 
therein. The flip-flopping of court directions worsened the situation and 
apparently caught Justices Chibomba and Munalula off guard, putting 
them in the embarrassing position of writing a rushed judgment. The 
rushed judgment may also explain why, unlike the majority judgment, 
none of the dissenting opinions directly spoke to the question of whether 
the Court had jurisdiction to hear the petition after the expiry of the 14-
day period, although this was a question expressly raised as a preliminary 
objection by the Attorney-General.
In the end, the court’s behaviour left commentators and observers 
with an acute sense that something had gone terribly wrong in the 
Constitutional Court. If parties have to comply with a 14-day time frame, 
then the Court’s directions and proceedings should have been organised 
accordingly, as the Kenyan Supreme Court did in its conduct of the 2013 
Presidential petition before it. The judges of the Zambian Constitutional 
Court were of one mind in condemning the behaviour of the petitioners’ 
lawyers, who questioned the Court’s impartiality. Nonetheless, in view 
of the unsatisfactory conduct of the proceedings by the Court, the Court 
should have taken a more introspective, if not critical view of their own 
conduct. 
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